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case of tipping 
1. Introduction 
  Tipping is a multi-billion-dollar phenomenon ($26 billion a year in U.S. restaurants 
alone, see Azar, 2003a) that traditional economic models, which assume selfish economic agents, 
find hard to explain. Tipping is an example of a social norm that people obey even though it is 
costly to do so. While tipping is an important and intriguing topic for its own sake, it is also 
useful to study because many issues are common to tipping and to other social norms, and it is 
easier to obtain data about tipping behavior than about conformity to other social norms, many of 
which have important economic implications. Few examples include the punishment (by the 
incumbent workers) of new workers who are willing to work for less than the incumbents’ wage; 
punishment of those who fail to contribute to public goods; and punishment of those who over-
extract from the commons.  
  Tipping is consistent with selfish consumers only if they think that tipping today will 
improve the service they get in the future, since the service today has already been provided. 
Most people, however, tip even when they never intend to see the tipped worker again, for 
example when traveling out of town or when tipping taxi drivers. Moreover, several studies 
suggest that even tipping by repeated customers is not motivated by future service considerations 
(see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986; Lynn and Grassman, 1990; Azar, 2002a).   
  If future service is not the reason for tipping, what is the reason? The usual explanation is 
that people tip in order to conform to the social norm of tipping (see for example Bodvarsson and 
  1Gibson, 1999).
1 Conformity to social norms is a central topic in sociology and social psychology. 
This literature (e.g. Aronson, Wilson and Akert, 1999) distinguishes between informational 
social influence (we conform because we think that others make good decisions) and normative 
social influence (we conform in order to be liked and accepted by others). Elster (1989) argues 
that social norms are sustained by the approval and disapproval of others, by feelings of 
embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame that a person suffers at the prospect of violating norms, 
and by positive emotions, like anger and indignation.  
  While conformity to the social norm is undoubtedly a major reason for tipping, I claim 
that it is not the only reason. I substantiate this claim using a theoretical model and historical 
evidence about tipping in the United States. The model suggests that if tipping were motivated 
only by the desire to conform to social norms, we would see tip percentages decreasing over 
time; the historical evidence is the exact opposite. This implies that people (at least some of 
them) tip not only because this is the norm but also because of other reasons, such as generosity, 
desire to impress others, willingness to show gratitude when receiving good service, and 
empathy for workers who work hard and earn low wages, such as waiters. 
  While the historical evidence is about tipping, the model can be used to analyze the 
evolution of social norms in general. It therefore contributes to the literature about social norms 
in general, and in particular their evolution.
2   Tipping is an example of an internal norm, which is 
                                                 
1 A detailed review of the literature about tipping is beyond the scope of this article; two good reviews of this 
literature are Lynn and McCall (2000a) and Azar (2003b). 
2 See for example Sethi (1996) for an evolutionary model of social norms, and Sethi and Somanathan (1996) for an 
evolutionary model in the context of common property resource use. In addition, Bowles (1998) discusses how 
  2defined as “a pattern of behavior enforced in part by internal sanctions, including shame, guilt 
and loss of self-esteem, as opposed to purely external sanctions, such as material rewards and 
punishment” (Gintis, 2003a). People internalize norms through three main channels: vertical 
transmission (from parents to children); oblique transmission (through socialization institutions 
such as secular and religious rituals, schools, and communications media); and horizontal 
transmission (from peer interactions) (Gintis, 2003a, 2003b).  
  Various models of norm evolution use conformist transmission to analyze several 
questions about social norms.
3 Henrich and Boyd (2001) present a model in which norms for 
cooperation and punishment are acquired through payoff-biased transmission (a tendency to 
copy the most successful individual) and conformist transmission. They show that if the number 
of punishment stages is finite
4 then an arbitrarily small amount of conformist transmission will 
stabilize cooperative behavior by stabilizing punishment at some finite stage. Gintis (2003a) 
shows that if an internal norm is fitness enhancing then internalization of norms is likely to be 
evolutionary stable. Gintis (2003b) presents a model that suggests that altruism can be sustained 
in equilibrium only when oblique transmission of altruism exists. He also shows that a high level 
                                                                                                                                                             
markets and economic institutions affect the evolution of norms and the process of cultural transmission, and Elster 
(1989) and Bergstrom (2002) provide good reviews of the literature about norms and their evolution. 
3 Conformist transmission is a tendency to copy the most frequent behavior in the population, using the popularity of 
a choice as an indirect measure of its worth. People may want to imitate popular behaviors because they are 
boundedly rational and cannot evaluate the payoff of each action they may take (and experimentation is too time-
consuming and costly). They therefore assume that behaviors that became popular are those who were successful 
(see Boyd and Richerson, 2001; Henrich and Boyd, 2001). 
4 One stage of punishment is just punishment of non-cooperators; two stages imply punishment of people who fail to 
punish non-cooperators, and so on. 
  3of cooperation can be sustained by the presence of a minority of individuals who cooperate 
unconditionally and punish defectors at a personal cost, the remaining individuals being self-
interested. Similarly, Akerlof (1980) claims that social customs can persist even when they are 
disadvantageous to the individual.  
  As opposed to the articles mentioned in the last paragraph, which suggest that under a 
few conditions norms are likely to be sustained in equilibrium, the model presented here offers a 
few reasonable conditions under which norms are likely to be eroded over time and may 
eventually vanish. In particular, if the agent chooses his action from a continuum of possible 
actions, the disutility from deviating from the norm is continuously differentiable, and the norm 
is costly to follow, it will be eroded over time. It follows that if we have a continuous action 
space and continuously differentiable disutility function and yet a norm is not eroded over time, 
it is not costly to follow; that is, following the norm offers benefits (other than conformity) that 
exceed its costs.  
   How do we compromise between the observation (supported by decades of research in 
sociology, anthropology and psychology) that people care about social norms, and the basic 
assumption in economics, that people are motivated by their own self-interest? Gintis (2003b) 
summarizes well the common assumption in economic models involving social norms: “… 
internalized norms are accepted not as instruments towards and constraints upon achieving other 
ends, but rather as arguments in the preference function that the individual maximizes” (see also 
Akerlof, 1980; Bernheim, 1994), an assumption adopted also in the current article.   
  42. The  model 
  A social norm of tipping exists and may change over time. The norm in period t is 
denoted by nt, where nt represents the appropriate tip (as a percentage of the bill).
5 Following the 
standard assumption in this literature (see Akerlof, 1980; Bernheim, 1994), I assume that the 
utility function is additively separable with respect to its traditional components and its social-
norm component. More specifically, the utility function is given by 
    u(g;  nt, θ) = d(g − nt) + θp(g) − bg,                   (1)         
where g is the tip in percentage of the bill, d is a function representing the disutility from social 
disapproval, b is the bill size (b > 0), and p is the utility from tipping that arises from feeling 
generous, impressing others, and so on.
6 It follows that p’ ≥ 0. The consumer takes as given the 
values of nt and θ and maximizes utility by choosing g, under the obvious constraint g ≥ 0. For 
simplicity, I leave the determination of b outside the model and treat b as a constant.
7  
The value of θ captures how much the consumer gets positive feelings from tipping, 
where θ ≥ 0. I do not assume that such positive feelings exist (θ = 0 captures the case that they 
                                                 
5 This assumption follows the actual norms in most instances – tips are usually computed as a percentage of the bill. 
The model has the same results, however, even if tip percentage is replaced with tip amount. 
6 g stands for “gratuity” (to avoid having t for both tip and time), d for “disapproval,” b for “bill,” and p for “positive 
feelings.” 
7 Beyond its simplifying role, this assumption has two good justifications. First, when the customer determines how 
much to tip, the bill is already fixed. Second, the determination of b is a standard consumer choice in which the 
consumer equates marginal utility from quantity and quality of food to its marginal cost. Adding the determination 
of b to the model (which will require adding also the utility from dining) adds nothing to the understanding of 
tipping, while unnecessarily complicating the model. 
  5do not exist), but rather show below that they must exist in equilibrium (at least for some 
consumers) if tips remain unchanged or increase over time. The population is potentially 
heterogeneous with respect to θ, with a cumulative distribution function F(θ). 
 The  term  −bg in the utility function is equal to the monetary amount of the tip, meaning 
that the utility function is quasi-linear in money. Since the tip is a small amount compared to the 
customer’s wealth, assuming quasi-linearity in money (and therefore risk neutrality in the range 
of wealth changes that result from tipping) is very reasonable, and in addition simplifies the 
analysis. 
The function d has several natural characteristics: first, the desire to conform to the social 
norm means that absent other motivations, the individual derives higher utility the closer his tip 
is to the norm. This means that d’(x) ≥ 0 for all x < 0 and d’(x) ≤ 0 for all x > 0 (where x = g − 
nt). I assume that d is continuously differentiable
 (I justify this assumption in the following 
section); it follows that d’(0) = 0. The following assumption summarizes the above: 
Assumption 1.  d is continuously differentiable, d’(x) ≥ 0 for all x < 0, and d’(x) ≤ 0 for all x > 0 
(it follows that d’(0) = 0). 
 
The social norm is endogenous and evolves according to the following rule: the norm in 
each period is the average tip in the previous period. Denoting the optimal choice of the tip in 
period t−1 by type θ as gt−1(θ, nt−1), we get:
8 
    n t = Eθ [gt−1(θ, nt−1)] =  ∫ gt−1(θ, nt−1)dF(θ),             (2) 
                                                 
8 That is, while g represents the tip percentage generally, gt stands for the optimal tip in period t. 
  6where the integration is over all the possible values of θ. Each consumer is a negligible fraction 
of the overall population and therefore the effect of his tip on the norm next period is negligible. 
I therefore assume for simplicity that an individual consumer does not think that he personally 
has any effect on the norm next period.
9  
3.  Justifying the assumption that d is continuously differentiable 
  The assumption that d is continuously differentiable is crucial in order to prove 
Propositions 1 and 2, so I want to explain why it makes sense. I argue that this assumption is 
reasonable when the norm represents the average action in the population, rather than a very 
specific action that everyone adheres to. This is because the norm is vague enough so that 
infinitesimal deviations from the norm do not cause a discrete (i.e. significantly higher than zero) 
disutility. I will give a few examples to clarify what I mean. Suppose first that we have a norm of 
not shirking at work. The question is what is considered shirking. Is saying “good morning” to 
your colleague shirking? Probably not. What about talking with him about matters that are 
unrelated to work for a minute? For 5 minutes? Is it considered shirking to talk with your spouse 
over the phone for 2 minutes if she calls? 5 minutes? 15 minutes? What about if you call? Is it 
fine to call your travel agency about personal travel? Does the answer depend on how much time 
you expect the call to take? What if the agency is closed when you are not at work, so you have 
                                                 
9 The alternative assumption, that consumers consider the effect of their actions on the norm, complicates the 
analysis to a great extent, but in fact reinforces the conclusion of the paper. Consumers then have another reason to 
tip below the norm, so that the norm next period will be lower and require them to pay less in tips. If the norm 
nevertheless remains unchanged, this reinforces the conclusion that consumers derive some benefits from tipping 
(this will be more clear in a few pages).  
  7no choice? The vagueness of what exactly is the norm implies that slight deviations do not 
trigger discrete disutility. In terms of the model, the norm in this context may be that the average 
worker actually works for 7 hours, 16 minutes and 13 seconds on an average 8-hours day. A 
worker who works 10 hours may feel that he is taken advantage of, and a worker who works 5 
hours may feel guilty. The question is whether a worker who works 7 hours, 16 minutes and 12 
seconds feels so guilty that it causes him a discrete disutility. Probably he does not.  
  I argue that the same idea applies to many social norms. Consider the norm of not 
cooperating with workers who are willing to work for less than the incumbents’ wages. Does the 
norm require to actually harass them? To exercise violence? How much? Should you actually 
prevent them from getting to the factory, or just not train them? If you do not actively train them 
but they stand by you and watch you as you work, is this considered that you trained them and 
disobeyed the norm? If yes, how far do you have to stand from them? 3 feet? 10 feet? 50 feet? 
How do you get them to be far enough? Should you refuse to work at all if they are present 
somewhere in the factory? Once again, the norm is some kind of average behavior, but is not 
such a clear focal point that infinitesimal deviations from it are likely to cause discrete disutility. 
  As a third example, let us consider tipping in restaurants. It seems that here we have a 
norm that everyone knows exactly what it is; most people in the US will tell you that the norm is 
to tip 15 percent. Yet etiquette books report that the figure is moving toward 20 percent for 
excellent service in upscale restaurants, and that in buffet or smorgasbord restaurants it is only 10 
percent (Post, 1997). Moreover, most people find it hard to compute exactly 15 percent; what 
should they do then (those who do not carry with them a calculator)? Also, it is not clear whether 
the 15 percent should be computed on the amount before or after tax.  
  8  In addition, 15 percent of the bill is often not an integer number of dollars and cents. 
Should it be rounded up to the next penny? Nickel? Dime? Quarter? Dollar? Is it acceptable to 
round it down rather than up? And what about service quality? If the tip was automatically 
computed as 15 percent regardless of service quality, then people should prefer service charges 
of 15 percent to tipping, as this saves them the need to compute the tip and find the exact amount 
required. Yet most people seem to prefer tipping to service charges.
10 Presumably, people prefer 
tipping because it allows them to punish the waiter for bad service and reward him for good 
service. Empirical research about tipping also finds that tips are positively correlated with service 
quality (though the effect of quality on tips is not large), see the meta-analysis by Lynn and 
McCall (2000b). This raises additional vagueness about the appropriate tip. What service quality 
deserves 15 percent tip? What service quality requires that we tip less, or more, and how much 
should we change the tip? If the waiter was kind and friendly but did not know to answer our 
questions about different dishes, should we take it against him when choosing the tip? How 
much? What if he was efficient but unfriendly?  
  Once again, the vagueness implies that slight deviations from the norm do not cause a 
discrete disutility. We may find empirically that the average tip for a bill of $40.65 (before tax) 
in a certain restaurant, for a certain waiter and a certain service quality, is $6.77, so that the norm 
in this case is to tip 16.65 percent. Yet the norm is vague enough that the customer is not likely 
to experience a discrete amount of disutility from guilt and shame if he tips instead just 16.6 
percent.  
  As empirical evidence that people in fact deviate from the 15 percent rule, I examined a 
                                                 
10 See the on-line polls on www.tipping.org.  
  9dataset that I obtained about tipping behavior of people.
11 The original data consists of surveys of 
697 customers in six different Minnesota restaurants and one coffee shop, conducted during 
1991. The customers were approached after they finished dining and were asked about several 
variables pertaining to their dining experience, including the bill size and tip size. Eliminating 
the data from the coffee shop due to the different tipping practices in coffee shops, I have 597 
observations, for which I computed the tip in percentage of the bill. Only 24 of these 597 
customers (4 percent) tipped between 14.9 and 15.1 percent of the bill. As an alternative, we can 
take the norm to be the average tip in the sample (13.72 percent of the bill) rather than taking 15 
percent. Only 25 out of 597 customers (4.2 percent) tipped between 13.62 and 13.82 percent of 
the bill. If the norm were clear and if small deviations from the norm triggered discrete disutility, 
we would expect tips to be much more concentrated around the norm than the evidence suggests. 
4.  The equilibrium with type θ = 0 consumers 
  The next proposition characterizes the optimal choice of a type θ = 0 consumer: 
Proposition 1.  Assume that θ = 0. If gt > 0 then nt − gt = k > 0, where k is a constant that does 
not depend on nt. It follows that gt = max [nt − k, 0].  
                                                
 
  Proposition 1 suggests that a consumer of type θ = 0, who does not derive any benefit 
from tipping except for the utility from conformity, always chooses to tip strictly less than the 
norm if the norm is positive. As long as his tip is positive, the difference between his tip and the 
 
11 I am grateful to Orn Bodvarsson and William Gibson for the data and to Michael Lynn for help obtaining the data. 
  10norm is constant. The following proposition summarizes what happens if everyone is of type θ = 
0: 
Proposition 2.  If all consumers are of type θ = 0, the norm converges to zero in a finite number 
of periods starting at any initial norm n0. 
 
  Proposition 2 suggests that if consumers had no benefit from tipping and they tipped only 
to avoid disutility that results from disobeying the norm, we should see the percentage tipped 
decreasing over time, and eventually the tipping norm would vanish. The intuition behind this 
result is that everyone tries to save a little bit every time he tips, and therefore tips below the 
norm. Since everyone does so, the norm becomes lower, consumers tip even less, and so on, until 
tipping vanishes. 
5.  Historical evidence about tipping 
  To examine the evolution of the tipping norm, I consulted etiquette books from different 
years and other sources, focusing on tipping of waiters in restaurants and taxi drivers. 
5.1. Tipping waiters 
  Segrave (1998, p. 14) reports that by 1895 the common tip for waiters in the United 
States was 10 percent. Hathaway (1928, p. 317) indicates that the percentage did not change: 
“There is, of course, the well-established ten-per-cent-of-the-check rule, which is in most 
instances, especially in public eating places, an excellent one to follow.” Post (1937, p. 833) 
reports the same number, with a qualification: “The usual tip for a waiter in a restaurant is 10 per 
cent of the bill, but never less than twenty-five cents in a restaurant with tablecloth on table.” 
  11Eventually, however, the percentage tipped started to increase: Post (1984, p. 392) mentions 
“Fifteen percent of the bill is standard in any restaurant.” Recently, this changed somewhat, 
again upwards; Post (1997, p. 532) writes, “It wasn’t long ago that 15 percent of the bill, 
excluding tax, was considered a generous tip in elegant restaurants. Now the figure is moving 
toward 20 percent for excellent service. In ordinary family-style restaurants 15 percent is still the 
norm.” 
5.2. Tipping taxi drivers 
  Tipping taxi drivers shows a similar trend of gradual increase in percentage tipped: 
Hathaway (1928, p. 324) claims, “In the large cities taxicab drivers expect a tip. Ten percent of 
the check is the usual amount.” Post (1937, p. 834) suggests the following non-linear scheme: 
“Taxi drivers are tipped about ten cents for a fifty-cent drive, fifteen cents for a dollar drive, and 
ten per cent for a long wait or distance.” Post (1984, p. 397) mentions higher tips: “Twenty-five 
cents is generally considered the minimum tip for a fare of up to $1.50. For higher fares a tip of 
approximately 15 percent is correct.” A little more than a decade later, Post (1997, p. 538) 
suggests: “In a large city such as New York, you should tip a minimum of 50 cents. In general, a 
tip to a taxi driver is about 20 percent of the fare.” 
6.  Can the model explain the historical evidence? 
The theoretical model suggests that if consumers derive no benefits from tipping and tip 
only because this is the norm, tip percentages should decrease over time. The historical evidence 
presented in the previous section, however, suggests the exact opposite: tip percentages in 
restaurants (which account for the majority of tipping) and taxis actually increased over the 
years. These observations suggest that the assumption that consumers do not derive benefits from 
  12tipping is not consistent with the historical evidence. The model will turn out to be even more 
useful, however, if it can make another step forward and show that when some consumers derive 
benefits from tipping, the model can be consistent with increasing tips over time. Fortunately, it 
can.  
It is necessary, however, to be more specific about the model in order to analyze the 
evolution of the norm (and then show that it can explain increasing tip percentages). The goal 
now, therefore, is to find specific functions for d and p and the distribution F(θ) that show how 
the norm can increase over time. Simple functions are of course preferred to complicated ones, 
as they make reading more enjoyable and the results more convincing. It turns out that even very 
simple functions enable to explain various possibilities of how the norm evolves.  
Consider the functional forms d(x) = −x
2 and p(g) = g, and assume that there are two 
types of consumers: a proportion 1−q (where 0 < q < 1) of the population is “low-type,” with θ = 
0, and the rest are “high-type,” with θ = βb > 0, where β is a parameter to be analyzed below. 
The utility function for both types becomes 
 u(g;  nt, θ) = −(g − nt)
2 + θg − bg. 
Proposition 3.  The evolution of the norm is determined according to the values of β and q as 
follows: 
(i) If β < 1, the norm converges to zero in a finite number of periods, and once it does, no 
one tips. If β = 1, the norm converges to zero but does not reach zero in any finite 
number of periods, for any n0 > 0. 
  13(ii) If 1 < β < 1/q, the norm converges to N = qb(β − 1)/2(1 − q) > 0, either from below 
or from above, depending on the initial norm n0. In equilibrium, high-type consumers tip 
and low-type do not. 
(iii) If β = 1/q, any norm N such that N ≥ b/2 is stable. If the initial norm is below b/2, the 
norm will converge to b/2 and only high-type consumers tip. If the initial norm is above 
b/2, it will not change, and everyone tips.  
(iv) If β > 1/q, the norm increases over time indefinitely and does not converge: nt → ∞ 
as t → ∞. Once the norm exceeds b/2, everyone tips.  
 
Proposition 3 suggests that even with the simple functional forms and distribution 
assumed in this section, the model can explain an increase in tip percentage. In fact, such an 
increase can happen in two different scenarios: either there is some finite stable norm and the 
initial norm is below it (part ii of the proposition), or it may be that the norm is increasing 
indefinitely (part iv). As with any model, the model is a simplification rather than an accurate 
description of the modeled phenomenon. I hope, however, that the model is convincing about its 
main points: the increase in tip percentages over the years is not consistent with the view that 
consumers tip only because this is a social norm, but is easily explained once we assume that at 
least some consumers derive benefits from tipping. The next section discusses briefly what these 
benefits may be.  
7.  Reasons for tipping 
  Beyond the desire to conform to the social norm (to avoid social disapproval, guilt and 
shame), what are the additional benefits that some people have when tipping? I suggest several 
  14such benefits. First, some people tip because they know that the worker’s wage is low since he 
and his employer expect tips to complement his income. Tipping poorly is then perceived not as 
withholding some extra income from the worker, but as withholding his wage, making poor 
tipping seems unfair. Tipping then prevents a disutility associated with the negative feeling of 
being unfair.  
  In addition, people often feel empathy and compassion for workers who earn low wages 
(especially if they also work hard). By tipping they reinforce their own self-image as good-
hearted people and therefore increase their utility. One indication of the importance of the 
worker’s income in the decision whether to tip him can be found by consulting books that 
discuss who should be tipped. For example, Star (1988, p. 11) writes about tipping ship crews, 
“The only other variable, from ship to ship, is whether or not the cruise line pays its crew top 
salaries. When it doesn’t, the crew is largely dependent on your tips for income.” 
  Another reason for tipping is that people want to feel generous and do not want to feel 
“cheap.” It is a somewhat philosophical question whether the actions taken by someone might 
change his perception of himself, but it seems reasonable to claim that when someone tips 20 
percent he feels more generous and has a better self-image than when he tips 10 percent. Tipping 
generously therefore improves the tipper’s self-esteem, encouraging him to tip even more than 
the norm. In addition to the internal positive feeling from being generous, the tipper often wants 
to impress others, for example other customers at the table or even the waiter. Tipping 
generously is a way to impress others that the tipper has the appreciated quality of generosity.  
Finally, people may derive utility from tipping because of our desire to reward people 
who help us. This desire for reciprocity and fairness received a lot of attention in economics 
recently (for excellent literature reviews of this subject see Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Sethi and 
  15Somanathan, 2003), and may be another reason why people enjoy tipping (when they feel that 
the service was good). 
The reasons mentioned above also provide a potential explanation why tip percentages in 
upscale establishments are often higher than in lower-level ones (see Post, 1997, p. 532; Star, 
1988, p. 26). The tip being a percentage of the price already compensates workers in upscale 
establishment very generously for the higher service quality they are expected to provide. Why 
should tip percentages then be higher in upscale establishments? The previous paragraphs may 
explain this puzzle. Naturally, the customers of an upscale restaurant are wealthier than those of 
a family-style restaurant. This increases the difference between the income of the tipper and the 
worker, and causes the tipper to feel more empathy and compassion for the worker, encouraging 
higher tips. In addition, the desire to feel generous and to impress others is higher on average for 
wealthier customers, since they are expected to show more generosity. 
8.  Implications for other social norms 
While the paper discusses the case of tipping, the theoretical model is applicable to other 
social norms as well. The benefits from following the norm may be different than those 
discussed here, and the costs of following other social norms may be non-monetary, but as long 
as such costs are present, the results of the model are valid. In particular, the model suggests that 
norms that are costly to follow (and offer no benefits that compensate for the costs) will be 
eroded over time (assuming a continuous action set, a norm that evolves according to the 
population’s behavior, and disutility from deviations that is continuously differentiable). This 
result shows that a reasonable change in the assumptions undermines the conclusions of Akerlof 
(1980) and others (see the introduction) about the sustainability of norms that are costly to 
  16follow. The major difference that leads to the different results in Akerlof’s model is that while 
Akerlof assumes that a person can either obey the norm or not (and therefore the punishment to 
deviations from the norm is not a function of the size of the deviation), the current model allows 
for deviations of different magnitude, and also allows for the change of the norm over time.
12  
Given the variety of social norms, probably both models are useful for analyzing some 
social norms. Tipping is a norm that seems to fit better under the current model; some other 
norms may be analyzed better using Akerlof’s framework. There are many norms other than 
tipping, however, for which it seems more reasonable to assume that the action set is continuous 
and that small deviations from the norm are not punished as harshly as large ones.  
The model also implies that if norms that seem to be costly are nevertheless sustained 
over time, examining these norms carefully may show that these norms are not really costly, 
because people who follow them derive some benefits (in addition to conformity) that exceed the 
costs of following the norm. One general norm in which this insight is important is the norm of 
punishment of people who deviate from other social norms. This norm is of great importance, 
because it in turn supports a wide range of social norms – all the norms whose sustainability 
depends on punishment of deviators. Examples for such norms include contributing to public 
goods and avoiding over-extracting of the commons.  
If the social norm of contributing to a certain public good is not eroded over time, then 
the model suggests that people derive benefits from contributing to public goods, for example 
from feeling altruistic and generous. Alternatively, people may contribute to public goods 
because this is the social norm, and whoever deviates is punished by others. The question is then 
                                                 
12 Akerlof assumes that the norm is fixed, but allows changes over time in the number of people who believe in the 
norm and who follow it. Bernheim (1994) also considers a fixed norm, though he allows for continuous actions sets. 
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offered for this puzzle (see for example Henrich and Boyd, 2001). This article suggests another 
simple explanation: maybe punishing is in fact not costly, because it yields benefits that exceed 
its costs. A person who does not contribute to the public good according to the norm hurts my 
interests as someone who enjoys the public good. In that case, my desire for reciprocity may lead 
me to derive a utility from hurting that person, despite the cost that I have to incur to do so.
13  
As Akerlof (1980) suggests, the norm according to which workers do not train and 
cooperate with new workers who are willing to do the same jobs for lower wages is of great 
importance in economics, as it provides a potential explanation for unemployment. The common 
terminology denotes the incumbents as insiders and the underbidding new workers as outsiders. 
As was discussed in detail in Section 3, there is a continuum of actions the insiders can take 
against the outsiders. While harassing the outsiders may be rational even in the absence of a 
social norm (see Lindbeck and Snower, 2001), it is obviously also a social norm: a worker’s 
utility from harassing an outsider depends on whether it is acceptable to do so and whether other 
insiders harass the outsider as well. Other things equal, an insider has higher utility (or lower 
disutility) from harassing the outsider if this is the norm. Nevertheless, small deviations from the 
norm (being slightly less hostile than others) do not entail a significant social disapproval or 
shame. The model presented here is then applicable.  
Since this norm prevailed over time and yet being hostile to others is generally costly, it 
                                                 
13 Most people derive utility from acting against others who hurt them. This is substantiated by experimental 
evidence that shows that people are willing to take costly actions to punish people who hurt them. For excellent 
reviews of some of this literature and related topics see Fehr and Gächter (2000); Fehr and Falk (2002); and Sethi 
and Somanathan (2003). 
  18follows that insiders derive benefits from following this norm in addition to conformity. One 
such benefit is the desire for revenge that results in willingness to act against the outsiders who 
hurt the insiders’ interests (since the firm may reduce the insiders’ wages or at least not increase 
them in the future when cheaper workers are available). Another benefit is simply to obtain 
monopoly power that allows the insiders to achieve higher wages than they could otherwise. By 
being hostile to outsiders and not training them, insiders decrease the outsiders’ productivity and 
increase their reservation wages (since the work becomes less pleasant for outsiders); these two 
effects reduce the profitability of hiring cheaper labor and increase the monopolistic power of the 
insiders (Lindbeck and Snower, 1986). A third benefit is to create a reputation that makes similar 
attempts to bring cheaper workers in the future less likely. The conclusion is, as Akerlof (1980) 
suggested, that this norm may cause involuntary unemployment, but unlike Akerlof’s 
assumption, the conclusion from the model presented here is that insiders have reasons to follow 
this norm in addition to conformity.  
9.   Conclusion 
  The article presents a theoretical model and historical evidence about the evolution of the 
tipping custom in the United States. Comparing the theory and the evidence suggests that at least 
some people derive benefits from tipping in addition to conforming to the social norm. Several 
such benefits are discussed, including the desire to feel generous and kind, to impress others, and 
to show gratitude and reward the worker for good service. The article also discusses the 
implications of the model to other social norms, including the general norm of punishing people 
who deviate from certain social norms, and the norm of harassing outsiders who are hired at 
lower wages than the insiders’. 
  19  Which directions for future research seem the most promising? Tipping is a significant 
economic phenomenon that attracted a lot of attention from psychologists, but little from 
economists. There is still much left to explore by both disciplines. One natural direction for 
future research that the current paper raises is to examine the different positive feelings that were 
suggested as possible explanations for tipping and to try to evaluate their relative magnitude 
using customer surveys and evidence on tipping behavior.  
  As for social norms more generally, they obviously affect our behavior, including our 
economic behavior, in many circumstances. There are many directions for future research in this 
area. The current article focuses on the evolution of norms and what sustains them. Other 
questions worth pursuing are how norms are created, and in what circumstances they are likely to 
emerge. Why different cultures reach different norms? Are social norms generally welfare 
improving or not? While these questions received some attention in the literature, they are far 
from being exhausted. 
  In addition to trying to understand social norms in general, norms are often very different 
from one another, suggesting that research that focuses on only one class of norms or even one 
norm is also worthwhile. It may be hard to gain insights about social norms if we try to obtain 
results that are true for all norms, but easier if we realize that social norms belong to different 
categories.  
  Another direction for future research is to think about how we should incorporate 
conformity with social norms in the utility function. The current article and previous ones 
suggest several alternatives, but this issue is important enough to justify additional research. 
Such research may also encourage more frequent consideration of social norms in economic 
models. Since social norms affect our economic behavior in many significant ways, 
  20incorporating them in economic models will provide us with a richer framework and predictions 
that are closer to the actual behavior of people; it will bring Homo Economicus and Homo 
Sapiens closer together.  
 
Appendix: proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1.  Substituting θ = 0 in (1) yields the utility function u(g; nt, θ = 0) = d(g 
− nt) − bg. It follows from Assumption 1 that u is strictly decreasing in g for all g ≥ nt. Moreover, 
the continuity of d’ implies that there exists r > 0 such that for all x ∈ [0, r) we have 0 ≤ d’(−x) < 
b. It follows that for all g > nt − r we have ∂u(g; nt, θ = 0)/∂g = d’(g − nt) − b < 0. This implies 
that if the constraint gt ≥ 0 does not bind (i.e. if gt > 0) then optimality of gt requires that gt ≤ nt − 
r. Notice that the value of r does not depend on nt.  
  In addition, notice that ∂u(g; nt, θ = 0)/∂g = d’(g − nt) − b. The value of g does not enter 
the marginal utility independently, only as part of the term g − nt. Since the utility function is 
continuous, information about the marginal utility is sufficient to determine the optimal value of 
g, implying that the condition for optimality is a function only of g − n t and b. Since b is a 
constant, it follows that gt − n t (i.e. the value of g − n t that maximizes utility) is a constant 
(assuming that the constraint does not bind, i.e. gt > 0). Combining this result with the first part 
of the proof yields gt = max [nt − k, 0], where k ≥ r > 0.
14                                
                                                 
14 If we assume that u is strictly concave, the first-order condition d’(gt − nt) − b = 0 determines the optimal value gt; 
rearranging shows that k = −[d’]
−1 (b), where [d’]
−1 is the inverse function of d’ ([d’]
−1 exists because d’ is a 
monotonic function when d is strictly concave). For example, if d(x) = −x
2, solving the consumer’s problem yields gt 
  21  
Proof of Proposition 2.  By the definition of the norm in (2), we get in this case that nt = gt−1(θ = 
0, nt−1). Using Proposition 1, we obtain nt = max [nt−1 − k, 0]. Substitute for nt−1, then for nt−2, and 
so on, to get the general result nt = max [n0 − tk, 0]. Therefore, for all t ≥ n0/k we get nt = 0, 
meaning that the norm converges to zero in a finite number of periods (the first integer number 
that is greater or equal to n0/k), and stays zero afterwards.                           
 
Proof of Proposition 3.  Since u is strictly concave in g, the optimal choice of g, denoted by gt, 
is given by the solution to the first-order condition, which after rearranging becomes gt = nt + (θ 
− b)/2, unless this value is negative; if it is negative, the concavity of u implies that gt = 0 is the 
optimal choice (given the constraint gt ≥ 0). It follows that for the high-type consumers (θ = βb), 
the optimal tip is given by gt
h = max [nt + b(β − 1)/2, 0], while for the low type it is gt
l = max [nt 
− b/2, 0]. To analyze the evolution of the norm over time, we should examine the function 
nt+1(nt) = Eθ [gt(θ, nt)].  
(i) When β ≤ 1, it is easy to see that if nt = 0 then no one tips and therefore nt+1 = 0. Now 
consider any nt > 0. If β < 1, both types tip strictly less the norm, and the difference between the 
tip and the norm is bounded from below by a constant, so the norm converges to zero in a finite 
number of periods (in a similar fashion to Proposition 1 and Proposition 2), and once it is zero, 
no one tips. If β = 1, we get gt
h = nt, and nt+1 = qnt + (1 − q)[max (nt − b/2, 0)], so the norm 
converges to zero but does not reach zero in any finite number of periods.  
                                                                                                                                                             
= nt − b/2 (unless the constraint gt ≥ 0 binds). Since I do not assume concavity of u, I cannot specify the exact 
condition that determines gt, but can still obtain the result that gt = max [nt − k, 0] as shown above. 
  22(ii) − (iv) Notice that gt
l > 0 if and only if nt > b/2. In cases (ii) − (iv) we have β > 1, so 
gt
h = max [nt + b(β − 1)/2, 0] = nt + b(β − 1)/2 > 0. Therefore, for all nt ≤ b/2, we have nt+1 = q[nt 
+ b(β − 1)/2] > 0, and for nt ≥ b/2 we have nt+1 = q[nt + b(β − 1)/2] + (1 − q)(nt − b/2) = nt − b/2 + 
qβb/2. Notice that when we draw the function nt+1(nt), the resulting vertical intercept is strictly 
positive, and the slope is q for all nt < b/2 and is 1 for all nt > b/2 (in nt = b/2 the function is 
kinked and the slope is not defined).  
What determines the dynamics of the norm is how nt+1(nt) is situated compared to the 45-
degree line from the origin (see Figure 1). This can be determined by comparing nt+1(b/2) to b/2. 
Since at nt = b/2 low-type consumers do not tip, nt+1(b/2) = q[nt + b(β − 1)/2] = qbβ/2. Therefore, 
nt+1(b/2) > b/2 if and only if qβ > 1. 
(ii) When 1 < β < 1/q we get that nt+1(b/2) < b/2, so nt+1(nt) and the 45-degree line cross at 
only one point, where nt < b/2. To the left of the intersection nt+1 is above the 45-degree line, and 
to the right nt+1 is below the 45-degree line. Since at the intersection the slope of nt+1 is q < 1, the 
norm converges to that point either from above or from below, depending on the initial norm n0. 
The point to which the norm converges is also the unique stable norm (denote it as N), and we 
can easily find it by substituting nt+1 = nt = N. Since we know that nt < b/2 at that point, we get N 
= nt+1 = q[nt + b(β − 1)/2] = q[N + b(β − 1)/2], which after rearranging becomes N = qb(β − 
1)/2(1 − q) > 0. Since N < b/2, it follows that in equilibrium high-type consumers tip and low-
type do not.  
(iii) When β = 1/q we get that nt+1(b/2) = b/2 and since the slope of nt+1 is 1 when nt > 
b/2, it follows that the 45-degree line and nt+1(nt) overlap for all nt ≥ b/2 (this can also be seen 
directly, since for nt > b/2 we have nt+1 = nt − b/2 + qβb/2 = nt). In addition, nt+1 lies above the 
45-degree line for all nt < b/2. This implies that if the initial norm is below b/2 it will converge to 
  23b/2 (only high-type consumers tip in this case) and if it is weakly above b/2 it remains the same 
and everyone tips (except for the knife-edge case where n0 = b/2, in which the norm remains b/2 
but only high-type consumers tip).  
(iv) When β > 1/q we get nt+1(b/2) > b/2, implying that nt+1 is always above the 45-degree 
line. This means that the norm never converges, but rather increases over time indefinitely. Since 
gt
l = max [nt − b/2, 0], once the norm exceeds b/2, everyone tips.                           
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  27Figure 1. Evolution of the norm for different values of β 
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